I. Introduction
The number of individuals engaged in nonfarm self-employment has increased markedly since the mid 1970s. As of 1997, business owners constituted approximately 13 percent of nonagricultural employees in the United States,' a fraction comparable to the percent-6o6 JOURNAL 
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
ences between the earnings of entrepreneurs and employees represent true compensating differentials or simply differences in firmor business-specific earnings growth across sectors. Finally, little attention is given to determining the appropriate measure of selfemployment income. The earnings variable typically reported in labor market surveys, termed net profit, is analogous to the amount reported to the Internal Revenue Service and may be unreliable because of the tax incentives to underreport income. In addition, the sectoral differences in other forms of compensation, such as employer-provided pensions and health insurance, which are not available to self-employed workers, have also generally not been considered when the self-employment earnings differential is being interpreted. This study uses data from the 1984 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to construct self-employment/ paid employment earnings differentials. The advantage of these data is that alternative measures of self-employment earnings may be constructed, in addition to net profit. Therefore, the sensitivity of the results to the measure of entrepreneurial earnings may be assessed. The empirical evidence supports the notion that self-employment offers substantial nonpecuniary benefits, such as "being your own boss," for many workers. Comparison of median earnings profiles shows that jobs in paid employment offer both higher initial earnings and greater earnings growth. After 10 years in business, median entrepreneurial earnings are 35 percent less than the predicted alternative wage on a paid job of the same duration, regardless of the self-employment earnings measure used. Moreover, median entrepreneurial earnings are always less than the predicted starting wage (for zero job tenure) available from an employer, regardless of the length of time in business. Little evidence is found suggesting that the earnings differential reflects the selection of low-ability paid employees into self-employment. Overall, it appears that many workers are willing to enter and remain in self-employment despite receiving returns substantially below their alternative paid employment wage.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the predictions of the various theoretical models of entrepreneurship for the self-employment earnings differential. Section III describes the data set and the construction of the alternative measures of entrepreneurial income used in the analysis. Section IV constructs the earnings profiles and examines their consistency with the theoretical predictions. Section V uses longitudinal data to examine the heterogeneity associated with movement into and out of selfemployment, and Section VI examines sectoral differences in the provision of health insurance. Section VII summarizes the findings.
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II. Theoretical Predictions
Investment, agency, matching, learning, and compensating differential models offer different predictions for the self-employment earnings differential. Suppose that individuals are wealth maximizers and choose self-employment if it yields the highest expected present value of career earnings. Let the earnings of individual i in sector j at time t be given by Yij,, and let yijt = Hjt8j + fj(EXPRt) + Eijt, j = SE, PE,
where Hit is a vector of observed individual productivity characteristics such as education, EXPR jt is a vector of experience variables, and
Eijt is a sector-specific random error term. The function fj (.) relates experience to earnings in sector j, describing the pattern of career earnings growth in paid and self-employment. The notation YaPE is used to denote the alternative wage available to an entrepreneur as a paid employee. Investment and agency models argue that while the expected present value of self-employment income is equal to the paid employment alternative for the marginal worker, a cross-sectional earnings differential may exist as a result of sectoral differences in the earnings-experience profiles generated by the fj(.) functions. The investment model suggests that self-employment earnings profiles will be steeper than those in paid employment because human and physical capital investments are not shared with an employer in self-employment. In contrast, the agency model argues that paid employment wage profiles will be steeper to discourage shirking since agency problems are not present in self-employment (Lazear 1981 
Earnings differentials may then reflect selection effects arising from differences in the sector-specific abilities of individuals. In the Roy model, worker i knows miSE and m&PE and matches himself to the sector in which he has the relative advantage; the learning model argues that individuals are uncertain of mij and may not immediately match themselves to the sector in which they have a relative advantage. Over time, low-ability entrepreneurs will drop out of self-employment, so that cross-sectional experience profiles also potentially re6o8 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY flect selection effects. Therefore, like the investment model, the learning model implies that self-employment earnings will overtake the alternative wage with experience. Superstar models (Rosen 1981) argue that small differences in skills may be magnified into large differences in returns in labor markets characterized by imperfect substitution among different sellers and in which the costs of production do not rise in proportion to the size of a seller's market. Examples of such markets include entertainment and personal and professional services, which are also characterized by high rates of self-employment. MacDonald (1988) demonstrates that, similarly to the learning model, workers who determine that they are not "rising stars" will return to paid employment. Consequently, the self-employment distribution will consist of a few experienced, highly successful entrepreneurs and a number of inexperienced individuals with low returns.
The models described thus far assume that workers are wealth maximizers. Differences in the nonpecuniary aspects of self-employment and wage work may lead to compensating earnings differences between the two sectors for equally productive workers. A popular view is that entrepreneurship offers greater freedom in the work environment, such as the opportunity to "be your own boss," implying that workers will choose self-employment despite self-employment earnings below their paid employment alternative. Evidence of positive compensating differentials for jobs with greater autonomy has been found for paid employees:3 Evans and Leighton (1989) show that individuals preferring greater autonomy are more likely to become self-employed, and Blanchflower and Oswald (1992) find that business owners experience greater job satisfaction than wage workers. Conversely, Kanbur (1982) emphasizes the role of risk aversion in the self-employment decision, suggesting that business owners may earn a risk premium because of the greater uncertainty of their earnings.
III. Data and Measurement Issues
The data used for this study are drawn from the 1984 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, which consists of nine four-month waves covering mid 1983 to mid 1986. This data set was chosen because it allows one to construct different measures of self- 'Duncan (1976) and Duncan and Stafford (1980) report positive compensating differentials for jobs offering greater "freedom in controlling hours worked" and "opportunities to choose an individual or flexible work schedule and an individual work pace." employment earnings, unlike the Current Population Survey (CPS). In addition, in contrast to longer panel data sets such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the large sample size of the SIPP provides a sufficiently large number of observations on individuals entering and leaving self-employment, which is necessary to examine the role that self-selection (matching) plays in explaining sectoral earnings differentials. The sample consists of 8,771 male school leavers aged 18-65 working in the nonfarm sector. This group was chosen for two reasons. First, because women are excluded, issues of labor market participation are of secondary importance. Second, the reported earnings of farmers may in large part be a function of government subsidy programs. Many doctors and lawyers advance by becoming partners in the firm, implying a reclassification from paid employment to self-employment. Moreover, the earnings of many of these highly paid professionals are likely to be top-coded. Since this is generally not the case for most business owners and only a small number of doctors and lawyers are in the SIPP, these professions are dropped from the analysis.4 Consequently, the analysis focuses on the experiences of small business owners.
Respondents to the SIPP were asked whether they were selfemployed (as either a main or secondary labor market activity) and, if so, to provide the name of the business. In addition, self-employed individuals were asked about their incorporation status. Both incorporated and unincorporated business owners are included in the self-employment category. In this paper, individuals are defined to be self-employed in a given 12-month period if this employment is reported as the main labor market activity for at least three months and is reported to be "noncasual."5 Sample members working simultaneously at a wage job and their own business are assigned to the sector in which they work the greatest number of hours per week. For the calendar year 1984, approximately 12.5 percent of the sample met these criteria for self-employment. Table 1 contrasts the productivity and demographic characteristics of entrepreneurs and employees in the sample for 1984. Most notably, business owners have a higher average level of potential labor market experience and are 4Headen (1990) analyzes differences between self-employed and employee doctors.
5Sample members responding that they are self-employed are then asked if they expect to earn more than $1,000 in the business over the next four months. If they answer no, self-employment is considered to be "casual" in the SIPP. The threemonth cutoff was chosen to eliminate seasonal or temporary self-employed workers. Given that individuals reporting self-employment in the SIPP respond to a detailed self-employment module, measurement error in self-employed status is likely to be very low. 
Equation (3) shows that the net profit generated by a business in year t, given by the difference between revenues and expenses (including depreciation), may be withdrawn from the business by the entrepreneur in the form of salary (termed the draw) or reinvested in the business. Net profit is the standard measure reported in the literature from data sets such as the CPS.6 However, reported net profit is generally an accounting profit that may be used as the basis for the calculation of net income for tax purposes and is therefore thought to understate the true profits of business owners, 6ii primarily through the overstatement of expenses due to tax considerations.7 Given the potential underreporting problem associated with net profit, the right-hand side of equation (3) provides potential alternative measures of self-employment earnings. Unlike other surveys, the SIPP reports the amount withdrawn in salary by all business owners. Therefore, the first alternative measure used in the paper is the draw. Because it is reported on a monthly basis in the SIPP, the draw is less likely to be influenced by tax considerations. Draw may be thought of as the amount of consumption the business generates for its owner.8
An entrepreneur investing in his business may report a low draw. While retained earnings and business net investment for year t are not reported in the SIPP, they may be approximated by the yearto-year change in the amount of equity held in the business at the beginning of period t and period t + 1.9 Consequently, the second alternative measure of self-employment income constructed in this paper, termed the equity-adjusted draw (EAD), is the sum of the draw in period t and the change in business equity between the beginning of period t and period t + 1.10 An economic definition of self-employment earnings should account for the opportunity cost of equity invested in the firm (see Wales 1973; Meyer 1990 ); the EAD is adjusted to account for the opportunity cost of business equity."
Because EAD (and the draw) is not reported to tax authorities, it may suffer less from underreporting error and hence be superior to net profit as a measure of self-employment income. In addition, the EAD also includes the returns to the entrepreneur in the form of the capital gain (or loss) in the value of the business, which is not incorporated in either net profit or draw. Unfortunately, business 'For example, accelerated depreciation methods allow entrepreneurs to immediately claim a significant portion of new investment as a deduction on their tax returns. Aronson (1991) describes the impact of the tax system on the underreporting of self-employment income. 8 The draw is the earnings measure reported by the CPS for incorporated business owners, since these individuals are considered to be employees of their own firms.
9 Entrepreneurs are asked to provide the value of the business and the debt held against it at the beginning of 1984 and 1985.
10 Note that the year-to-year change in business equity captures both the net investment in the business and any implicit returns in the form of goodwill, such as the increased or decreased value of a particular location or client list.
It is assumed that the opportunity cost is given by the alternative risk-free rate of return available to the entrepreneur in 1984, which is measured by the six-month Treasury bill rate in 1984. The Treasury bill rate multiplied by 1984 business equity is subtracted from the EAD to give the third measure of self-employment income. Other measures of opportunity cost were considered, such as the return on the Standard & Poor's 500 or the S&P small-stock index, but these alternatives did not qualitatively affect the empirical findings. equity and wealth are typically imprecisely measured in survey data, and hence EAD is likely to be a noisy measure of self-employment earnings. Table 2 presents measures of the distribution of reported business value and equity in 1984 from the SIPP. The first two rows of the table show that most businesses are fairly small. Median business value and equity are both less than $20,000. Consequently, retained earnings and business value appreciation are likely to be small for most entrepreneurs, implying that the draw and EAD measures will be quite similar. However, a minority of the self-employed have large financial stakes in their businesses, implying that the net capital gain on the business could be a fairly large component of their self-employment return.'2 Data limitations hindered construction of the three alternative measures of self-employment earnings for all entrepreneurs in the SIPP. The draw measure is available for each business owner, whereas the net profit variable is available for approximately twothirds of the self-employed sample. Because of nonreporting of business equity and debt, the EAD measure is constructed for approximately one-fourth of the business owners in 1984. A variety 12 Measures of business equity are generally not reported in most data sets, so it is difficult to assess the reliability of the SIPP business value and equity data. Curtin, Juster, and Morgan (1989) compared wealth data from the SIPP, PSID, and 1983 Survey of Consumer Finance. Theyjudged the SIPP data to be of high quality. However, the SIPP does appear to somewhat understate the business equity holdings among high-income (over $50,000) and wealthy individuals (business equity over $100,000) compared to the other data sets. One major reason for the difference is that a non-household head was more likely to answer the wealth questions in the SIPP. When the EAD measure was constructed, observations for which equity was reported by someone other than the business owner were dropped. Consequently, the business valuations used to construct the EAD are less likely to suffer from underreporting. Note that the equity figures for individuals earning less than $50,000 and with business equity less than $100,000 were comparable across data sets. This group of individuals constitutes the vast majority (over 85 percent) of entrepreneurs. of procedures indicated that the subsamples of entrepreneurs for whom the net profit and EAD can be constructed are random samples of the self-employed population.'3 As a result, the full selfemployment sample is used in comparisons of the draw with wages, whereas the appropriate subsamples are used for the net profit and EAD measures.'4 Hourly earnings measures are used in order to focus attention on the earnings differential rather than on differences in hours worked, although the findings are qualitatively similar for weekly earnings.
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The empirical distributions of the three measures of 1984 average hourly self-employment earnings are compared with the hourly wage in figure 1. The figure exhibits two notable characteristics. First, regardless of the measure used, the central tendency of the distribution of self-employment returns is less than that of the wage distribution. Second, the distribution of self-employment earnings exhibits greater dispersion and is more skewed than the wage. As indicated by the long upper tails of the self-employment distributions, approximately 13 percent of business owners earn more than "3A detailed description of the construction of the various samples, as well as the procedures used to examine the representativeness of the EAD and net profit subsamples, is provided in the Appendix.
14 The correlations between the three measures are all positive and statistically significant at the .01 level. The rank correlation is stronger (.70) between draw and EAD than between either net profit and draw (.50) or net profit and EAD (.45). The conventional net profit measure tends to be a lower-bound measure of entrepreneurial earnings. Column 3 of the table shows that mean self-employment earnings as measured by the draw are not significantly different from the wage, whereas column 4 indicates a positive difference of 18 percent when the EAD measure is used. Like net profit, both measures exhibit much greater variation than the wage, and the earnings quartiles imply that substantial returns to self-employment are concentrated among a few entrepreneurs. Finally, recall that the difference between EAD and the draw represents the net capital gain on business equity, implying that 20 percent of mean (but only 6 percent of median) entrepreneurial earnings reflects the net appreciation of the business.
IV. Earnings Profiles
This section constructs earnings profiles using the various measures of self-employment income and wages to determine whether the predictions of the investment, agency, learning, superstar, and compensating differential models are consistent with the evidence. Given the skewness observed in the data, both ordinary least squares (OLS) and quantile regressions of equation (1) The OLS parameter estimates for self-employed workers indicate that the coefficients on the productivity and demographic controls generally have the same sign across earnings measures, with the draw estimates being most similar to those for net profit. The EAD coefficients tend to be higher in absolute magnitude but are less precisely estimated, largely because of the substantial variation exhibited by the dependent variable. The estimates for the .25 and .50 quantiles in columns 2 and 3 tend to be smaller in magnitude than those found using OLS, particularly in the case of the education variables, whereas the .75 quantile estimates are larger. This is to be expected given the right skewness in the entrepreneurial earnings distributions found in the previous section. In contrast, the OLS and quantile regression results for employees are generally quite similar, reflecting the relative lack of skewness of the wage distribution.
The productivity variables have the expected sign and are similar to the results of Borjas and Bronars (1989) and Evans and Leighton (1989) . Less educated entrepreneurs generally suffer a smaller earnings penalty than wage workers. For example, the earnings of self-15 A number of entrepreneurs (10 percent) report zero or negative earnings. So as not to exclude these observations, earnings levels rather than log(earnings) are used in the regressions. To examine the sensitivity of the results to this specification, all the regressions were reestimated using log(earnings) as the dependent variable, with observations of negative earnings recoded to a small positive earnings value. The qualitative nature of the results when logs were used was identical to that when levels were used.
16 Experience-tenure interactions were insignificant in the self-employment regressions. 17 Nonwhite entrepreneurs may have lower returns because of such factors as consumer discrimination (Borjas and Bronars 1989; Meyer 1990 ).
18 Fuchs (1982) argues that older workers may view self-employment as a form of partial retirement. The results for thefsE (.) andfPE (.) experience functions also show marked differences across sectors. The hypothesis that the labor market experience coefficients are jointly zero in the self-employment regressions can be rejected only for the seventy-fifth percentile estimates.19 On the other hand, the hypothesis that the business tenure coefficients are jointly zero is generally rejected. As is the case for most of the demographic controls, business tenure has a larger effect on mean earnings than on the median or lower quartile. Median self-employment earnings profiles may thus be expected to exhibit less earnings growth than the mean. In addition, labor market experience has a greater effect on paid employee wages than is the case for entrepreneurs. Both the labor market experience and job tenure coefficients are strongly significant and have a generally similar magnitude in the OLS and quantile regressions.
The differences in the relationship between earnings and experience across sectors are illustrated more fully by the tenure and entry wage profiles, constructed using fitted values generated from table 4. Let Yj(X, Tj) denote predicted sector j earnings for workers with X years of potential labor market experience and Tj years of tenure in a particular job or business. Finally, the profiles at the seventy-fifth percentile, shown in figure 2d, emphasize the skewness of the self-employment earnings distribution. When the EAD measure is used, self-employment offers both higher initial earnings and greater earnings growth than paid employment jobs. In addition, while less than the wage, the earnings differential calculated using either the draw or net profit is substantially smaller at the upper quartile than at the median.
Since an entrepreneur returning to paid employment starts the new job with zero tenure, figure 3 Figure 3d shows that successful entrepreneurs in the upper quartile of the distribution initially would lose if they were to return to paid employment.
A. Implications for the Theoretical Models
The lower quartile and median tenure and entry wage profiles are not consistent with predictions of the investment, agency, and learning models. In each case, the overtaking behavior predicted by these models is not found. Instead, the profiles indicate that individuals are willing to enter self-employment despite a stream of future returns at least 35 percent less than that available as a paid employee. This is consistent with predictions of a positive compensating differential for self-employment. Reinforcing the conclusion that many entrepreneurs receive substantial nonpecuniary benefits, such as "being their own boss," the median entry wage profile shows that entrepreneurs remain in business despite the fact that the alternative starting wage is always greater than self-employment earnings.
The earnings profiles for the mean and upper quartile provide some evidence consistent with the investment, learning, and superstar models. However, the conclusions rest on the self-employment earnings measure used. The mean wage and EAD profiles suggest that the timing of compensation is fairly similar across sectors, whereas the plots for the mean draw and net profit measures yield It may be the case that self-employment carries a stigma, so that after a few periods in business, entrepreneurs wishing to return to paid employment receive lower wage offers than other workers with the same level of total labor market experience. To investigate this possibility, the wage equation is estimated using the sample of wage and salary workers in 1985 (PE85 workers) including the variable SE84, which indicates whether the worker had been self-employed in 1984. If self-employment carries a negative stigma, then the coefficient on SE84 is expected to be negative. The OLS and quantile regression estimates, shown in the first row of panel B of table 6, indicate that entrepreneurs returning to paid employment actually earn a higher wage than employees with the same observed characteristics, although the difference is statistically significant only for the median. 
A simple way to investigate whether condition (4) holds is to again use Heckman's (1979) sample selection framework. Following his two-step procedure, we first estimate a probit regression for the probability that a self-employed worker in 1984 enters paid employment in 1985. We then estimate equation (1) 
VI. Other Considerations
The earnings differentials calculated in this paper have considered only paid wages or earnings. However, nonwage compensation, such as employer-provided health insurance, is not incorporated into employee earnings. To the extent that fringe benefits are substituted for wages in paid employment, the self-employment earnings differential found above may understate the true difference in compensation across sectors. Table 7 describes the extent and source ofhealth insurance coverage of paid employees and business owners. Panel A indicates that entrepreneurs were almost twice as likely to be uninsured and more likely to be covered by a policy in the name of another household member.30 This finding is consistent with the predictions of Devine's (1992) household model of the self-employment decision that the wife will choose a job that is more likely to offer fringe benefits, such as health insurance, that are costly for nonemployees to obtain. This allows the husband to enjoy the nonpecuniary benefits of self-employment. Panel B presents multinomial logit estimates indicating that the patterns observed in panel A persist after one controls for differences in observed characteristics across sectors. Finally, while the dollar amount of the insurance premium is not reported in the SIPP, panel C reports that over half of all entrepreneurs pay for health insurance out of pocket, compared to only 6 percent of paid employees with coverage. Given that the self-employed are both less likely to have health insurance and more likely to pay for it out of pocket, the value of the compensating differential associated with selfemployment may be even greater than that reflected by the difference in earnings.
VII. Conclusion
A variety of factors have been proposed to explain the difference in the earnings of entrepreneurs and paid employees. For most entrepreneurs, the empirical evidence of the paper is consistent with the notion that self-employment offers significant nonpecuniary benefits, such as "being your own boss." Many entrepreneurs have not only lower initial earnings than employees with the same observed characteristics but also lower earnings growth. For example, the present value to the median entrepreneur of a business lasting 25 years is over 25 percent less than the present value of a paid job of the same duration. Even more striking, median self-employment earnings never overtake the alternative entry wage available on a paid job with zero job tenure. These results are generally robust to the measure of self-employment earnings used. Moreover, this selfemployment differential may be a lower bound for the difference in total compensation across sectors since entrepreneurs are less likely to have health insurance. Paid employees are more likely to have all or part of their health insurance paid for by their employer.
Such nonwage benefits may represent over 20 percent of paid employment compensation. The results also provide some support for the superstar model since a handful of entrepreneurs earn substantial returns in selfemployment. In particular, when the EAD measure is used, selfemployment earnings profiles were above those in paid employment at the seventy-fifth percentile. Little evidence is found to support the selection explanation for these findings. The wages of workers entering self-employment and the wages of entrepreneurs returning to paid employment are not significantly different from the earnings of other employees.
The conclusion that the self-employment earnings differential reflects entrepreneurs' willingness to sacrifice substantial earnings in exchange for the nonpecuniary benefits of owning a business appears to be quite robust to a variety of alternative explanations. Nevertheless, some limitations of the present analysis must be kept in mind. First, the analysis focuses on the experiences of small business owners. The findings may be quite different for highly paid professionals such as doctors or lawyers, where superstar considerations may be even more important. Second, differences in the probabilities of survival in a business versus a job have not been stressed. To the extent that involuntary separations are greater in self-employment than in wage work, the conclusions of this paper would be strengthened since individuals would have even lower expected earnings in entrepreneurship. Third, the results presented here are of a reduced form, providing evidence as to whether observed earnings differentials are consistent with the predictions of a variety of theoretical models. Structural estimates of the compensating differential, for example, would require an explicit specification of worker utility and the probability of observing particular employment and earnings sequences over the life cycle, as in dynamic programming models of occupational choice. Future research along these lines would be most valuable in adding to our understanding of selfemployment.
